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DEATH OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY-
ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES UNDER SOUTH
CAROLINA'S LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT
A. Common Law and Lord Campbell's Act
Negligently causing the death of another person at common
law carried far less onerous legal consequences than did negli-
gently causing a much lesser degree of bodily harm. The law
recognized no cause of action in the decedent's relations for loss
of his prospective services,1 and the decedent's estate could not
recover because actions for personal injury did not survive.
2
Abatement of causes of action as the consequence of the death
of one of the parties has been called "one of the least rational
parts of . . . [common] law."3 To be sure, the original pre-
sumably rational basis for the rule has been obscured by the
centuries, 4 but the absence of an articulated rationale did not
precipitate rapid reform. On the contrary, remedy came only
very gradually. Although an early statute provided for the
survival of causes of action arising out of trespass to a deceased
plaintiff's personal property,5 survival of actions concerning
damages to real property was not permitted in England until
1833,6 and still another century passed before the English
allowed personal injury actions to survive.7
During this century, however, an entirely different kind of
statutory remedy was invented. Known as Lord Campbell's
Act, s this 1846 statute created a cause of action for the benefit
of certain members of the family of a wrongfully killed de-
cedent. South Carolina, along with most American states,
rather quickly followed the lead of the English and passed a
similar measure.9 Commenting on the passage of the South
Carolina act, an early case included the following statement:
1. The husband of an injured wife did have a cause of action for loss of
his wife's services; but, although the action did not abate at her death, the
recovery was limited to damages sustained by the husband before her death.
PROSSER, TORTS § 119, at 911 (3d ed. 1964); see, e.g., Bailey v. Long, 172
N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916).
2. See, e.g., TIFFANY, DEATH By WRONGFUL AcT § 1 (2d ed. 1913).
3. POLLOcx, TORTS 71 (American-From 3d English ed. 1894).
4. See PRossER, TORTS § 120, at 920 (3d ed. 1964).
5. 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330).
6. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42 (1833).
7. Law Reform Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41.
8. The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
9. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1859, No. 4480.
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The evil here at the passage of the act of 1859 ... was,
that personal actions, ex delicto, at common law died with
the person. This was regarded as a great hardship on the
surviving family, especially the widow and minor children,
and so many disasters occurring upon railroads and other
new agencies, touching the pecuniary interests and welfare
of such survivors, it was thought wise in 1859 to enact here
said Lord Campbell's act, repealing and amending the com-
mon law, by giving a right of action in all common law
cases of injury resulting from wrongful acts, neglect, or
defaults, to the surviving family of a deceased, where, if he
had lived, an action could have been maintained by him.10
South Carolina made other encroachments on the irrationality
of this area of the common law by enacting statutes to provide
for the survival of causes of action growing out of damage to
real estate" and injuries to the person and personal property.12
As a result, in South Carolina today there are two causes of
action for wrongful death. The Survival Act'3 provides for
the survival of an action for the injuries to the deceased; the
recovery goes to his estate.' 4 The focus is on the deceased, and
no recovery is permitted for damage to his family.15 South
Carolina's present version of Lord Campbell's Act,16 on the
other hand, creates a cause of action for certain named bene-
ficiaries, and the recovery is for damages resulting to the bene-
ficiaries.
B. The Distinctive Character of the South Carolina Act
A minority of the statutes enacted by American states rejected
the remedial approach adopted by the English act. Concerned
with the loss to the decedent's estate, these statutes took as the
measure of damages the loss of the amount the decedent would
have accumulated throughout his normal life expectancy,17 or,
10. All v. County of Barnwell, 29 S.C. 161, 168, 7 S.E. 58, 59-60 (1888).
11. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1892, No. 15.
12. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1905, No. 471.
13. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-209 (1962).
14. E.g., Bennett v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 97 S.C. 27, 81 S.E.
189 (1914).
15. E.g., Croft v. Hall, 208 S.C. 187, 37 S.E.2d 537 (1946) (by implication).
16. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 10-1951 to -1956 (1962).
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in some states, the amount he would have earned, less his per-
sonal expenses, had he lived out his life expectancy.18 Essen-
tially these statutes were broadened survival acts.19
South Carolina's Death Act, however, was very closely pat-
terned after the original English act. In language taken directly
from the English act, the original South Carolina act provided:
[Tihe jury may give such damages as they may think pro-
portioned to the injury resulting from such death, to the
parties respectively for whom, and for whose benefit such
action shall be brought .... 20
Although based squarely on the original Lord Campbell's
Act, South Carolina's Death Act has acquired a distinctive
character, particularly with respect to damages. This is pri-
marily the result of two statutory amendments and a series of
judicial interpretations.21
The original South Carolina act made no distinction between
the named beneficiaries. The action could be maintained for
the benefit of the spouse, children and parents of the decedent.22
In 1898 the statute was amended so as to divide the beneficiaries
into three classes: spouse and children, parents, and heirs at
law.23 The classes as listed were in descending order of prefer-
ence, and the existence of beneficiaries in one class barred recov-
ery by beneficiaries in a less preferred class. This is the statu-
tory scheme presently employed.24
The other two salient historical features of our Death Act
spring from South Carolina's reaction to early interpretation
of the English act limiting damages to the pecuniary loss of the
beneficiaries:
There may be a calculation of the pecuniary loss sustained
by the different members of the family from the death of
18. E.g., Mendenhall v. North Carolina R.R., 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480
(1898).
19. At least one state enacted a strictly punitive wrongful death statute.
See, e.g., Richmond & D. R.R. v. Freeman, 98 Ala. 289, 11 So. 800 (1892).
20. S.C. Acts & 3. Res. 1859, No. 4480.
21. Although it is of no practical importance today, it is perhaps interesting
to note that at one time the South Carolina act required, as a condition pre-
cedent to any recovery, proof of the beneficiary's dependency on the decedent.
S.C. AcTs & 3. REs. 1898, No. 491. This limitation was rather quickly stricken
from the act. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1902, No. 579.
22. S.C. Acts & 3. Res. 1859, No. 4480.
23. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1898, No. 491.
24. S.C. CODE ANx. § 10-1952 (1962).
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one of them: but, if the jury were to proceed to estimate
the respective degrees of mental anguish of a widow and
twelve children from the death of the father of the family,
a serious danger might arise of damages being given to the
ruin of defendants. We must recollect that the Act we are
construing applies not only to great railway companies but
to little tradesmen who send out a cart and horse in the care
of an apprentice.25
Contrary to the majority of American states,'2 6 South Carolina
has not only declined to restrict recovery to pecuniary loss,
27
but also has by statutory amendment permitted beneficiaries to
recover punitive damages in appropriate cases.28
C. Pecuniary Loss "P ius"
The view that only damages for pecuniary loss could be recov-
ered in actions under South Carolina's Death Act was appar-
ently the accepted view of the bar in the early cases. 2 9 The
South Carolina Supreme Court, however, in Nohrden v. North-
eastern R.R.30 repudiated the English construction of the act.
In discussing whether the jury may take into consideration the
wounded feelings of the beneficiaries resulting from the death
of their relative, the court said that the damages allowed by the
statute are "whatever damages the jury may think are a proper
compensation to the parties for whose benefit the action is
brought . . . whether arising from pecuniary loss or other-
wise. . .."81
South Carolina's position was further clarified in Brickman
v. Southern Ry.8 2 where the court specifically upheld the fol-
lowing charge of the trial court:
25. Blake v. Midland R.R., 10 Q.B. 93, 111, 118 Eng. Rep. Reprint 35, 42
(1852).
26. E.g., McCoRmicm, DAmAGES § 99, at 347 (1935).
27. E.g., Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97
(1938).
28. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-1954 (1962).
29. See Petrie v. Columbia & Greenville R.R., 29 S.C. 303, 7 S.E. 515
(1888), where, although the supreme court had no occasion to discuss the
question, the record indicates that the trial judge had instructed the jury that
they could consider only pecuniary loss. Id. at 307.
30. 59 S.C. 87, 37 S.E. 228 (1900).
31. Id. at 108, 37 S.E. at 240.
32. 74 S.C. 306, 54 S.E. 553 (1906).
1967] NoTm
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You [the jury] can also take into consideration any injury
which these parties have sustained by reason of mental
anguish or suffering by reason of the death of . . . [the
deceased husband and father], and . . . any damages . . .
that they have sustained by loss of his companionship as a
father and a husband .... 83
The cases have also made it plain that the existence of pecuniary
damage is in no sense a condition precedent to recovery for
other damages.
84
What has come to be the standard statement of the elements
of recovery in actions under the South Carolina Death Act was
made in the leading case of Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. :3
[T]he elements of damage, in actions for wrongful death,
include: (1) Pecuniary loss, (2) mental shock and suffer-
ing, (8) wounded feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, (5) loss of
companionship, and (6) deprivation of the use and comfort
of the intestate's society, the loss of his experience, knowl-
edge, and judgment in managing the affairs of himself and
of his beneficiaries, in addition to the loss of his ability to
earn money for the support, maintenance, care and protec-
tion of his wife and children, and for the education and
training of the latter.... And, since only one action may
be maintained, it is proper to include all damages, present
and prospective, which are naturally the proximate conse-
quence of the wrongful act.86
This liberal interpretation of South Carolina's Death Act
seems to be the better view for at least two reasons. The purpose
of the act is compensation for the loss of a family member, a
person whose worth to the beneficiary is only partially pecuni-
ary; and, even in jurisdictions which ostensibly adhere to the
pecuniary loss standard, courts are often disinclined to strike
down large verdicts in cases where the element of pecuniary loss
is, in reality, absent and obvious substantial sentimental loss is
present.8
7
33. Id. at 310, 54 S.E. at 554. But cf. Stuckey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
60 S.C. 237, 38 S.E. 416 (1901).
34. E.g., Nelson v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry., 231 S.C. 351, 98 S.E.2d
798 (1957) (by implication).
35. 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938).
36. Id. at 418-19, 197 S.E. at 104-05.
37. See, e.g., Reed v. Eubanks, 232 Miss. 27, 98 So. 2d 132 (1957).
[Vol. 19
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D. Valuation of the Family's Lo88
Armed with the liberal statement of South Carolina's ap-
proach to damages in actions under the Death Act, the plaintiff
has the task of placing before the jury such facts as will aid
them in their estimation of the damages to the beneficiaries for
whom the action is brought. Particularly in the case of the
death of the income-producing head of a family, a primary ele-
ment of damages is the loss of the decedent's financial contribu-
tions. The actual damage is the present value of the amount the
decedent would have earned if he had lived out his normal life,
less his personal expenses, accumulations and taxes.
88
Material to a determination of this amount, of course, is the
question of how long the decedent would have provided finan-
cial support. In South Carolina there is a statutory mortality
table 9 on the basis of which the judge may charge the jury as
to the decedent's life expectancy.40 The mortality table, how-
ever, is only a part of the possible evidence of life expectancy.
The health and habits of the deceased are also important con-
siderations. 41
Aside from this, however, life expectancy is not the proper
consideration with respect to loss of financial support. The
material determination is rather the number of years which the
decedent would have worked and made financial contribution
to the support of the beneficiaries. Evidence of mandatory
retirement at a certain age, for example, would be extremely
relevant.
In addition to time considerations, other types of information
are necessary to ascertain a reasonable estimation of damages
from loss of contributions. Evidence tending to show the income
of the deceased, his prospects for advancement, his industry and
ambition, his particular abilities, his habits of economy and his
disposition to contribute to his family is important.42 Inflation
is also a proper consideration.4"
38. See generally Hofflander, Loss Of Income Due To Wrongful Death:
A Method Of Measurement, 1965 INs. LJ. 92. On the propriety of consider-
ing income tax liability in computing loss of earnings, see Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d
320 (1950).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (1962).
40. E.g., Hambright v. Atlanta & Charlotte A.L. Ry., 102 S.C. 166, 86
S.E. 375 (1915).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (1962).
42. See, e.g., Leppard v. Southern Ry., 174 S.C. 237, 177 S.E. 129 (1934)
(dictum) (habitual use of intoxicants).
43. Accord, Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955); Rogers
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 S.C. 66, 71 S.E.2d 585 (1952).
1967] NOTES
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Another factor which seems highly relevant to a determination
of the actual loss of contributions suffered by the beneficiaries
is the life expectancies of the beneficiaries. Obviously one can-
not receive financial contributions for his support for a period
extending beyond his life. Our court, however, has chosen to
exclude this factor from the jury's consideration: "We fail to
see wherein the probable duration of the father's life [the action
was brought for the benefit of the decedent's father] has any
relevance to the issues involved .... - 4
This position is perhaps appropriate in most cases where a
wife and children are the beneficiaries of an action for the
wrongful death of the husband and father. In these cases it is
quite reasonable to infer that the decedent's life expectancy was
less than that of the beneficiaries and, consequently, that his life
expectancy is the only one material to a determination of dam-
ages. In other cases, however, where the beneficiary is the par-
ent of a deceased adult child, the life expectancy of the bene-
ficiary is quite relevant to a determination of the actual loss
suffered.
The life expectancy of the beneficiary is also material to the
evaluation of another possible element of damages, namely, loss
of expectancy of inheritance from the decedent. Apparently no
South Carolina cases have discussed this element. If the jury
is permitted to take the total probable earnings of the decedent
as the measure of loss of contributions, then, arguably, there is
no room for consideration of loss of inheritance. The more accu-
rate approach would seem to be, however, to consider the loss of
contributions during the decedent's lifetime and the loss of in-
heritance expectancy separately.
There is a sharp split among the authorities in other jurisdic-
tions, but a majority of those which have considered the question
have allowed loss of expectancy of inheritance to be considered
by the jury where evidence of such loss was presented.45 The
jurisdictions which have disallowed this element have done so
largely on the ground that such damages are too speculative.
4
If this danger is mitigated by evidence of the decedent's savings
and investment habits and his disposition to contribute to his
44. Trimmier v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 81 S.C. 203, 213, 62
S.E. 209, 212 (1908); accord, Turbyfill v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry.,
86 S.C. 379, 68 S.E. 687 (1910).
45. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 477 (1963).
46. Id. at 485 n. 10.
[Vol. 19
7
Wynn: Death of the Head of the Family--Elements of Damages under South
Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
family, consideration of loss of expectancy of inheritance would
seem to be eminently reasonable.
An element of damages long recognized in South Carolina is
recovery for funeral expenses.
[1]ormally funeral expenses do not constitute an item of
damages in a Lord Campbell's Act case.... The law, how-
ever, is settled in this State that where such expenses are
paid by the beneficiary they are a proper element of dam-
ages.4
7
In the same general area is the element of medical expenses
incurred prior to death as a result of the wrongful injury. Our
court has apparently not had occasion to discuss this question.
Recovery for medical expenses is not strictly comparable to
recovery for funeral expenses because the former are incurred
prior to death and obviously are not part of the consequences
of death. The statute says that "the jury may give such dam-
ages ... as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting
from such death .... ,148 Although many states allow recovery
for medical expenses if the beneficiary is liable for same,49 it
seems that such expenses would not be recoverable under the
South Carolina Death Act.50
The remaining obviously pecuniarily valuable element is loss
of the decedent's services. With this element, as well as the
non-pecuniary elements to be mentioned later, life expectancy
is relevant.51 In this area, however, estimation of monetary value
is more difficult. Important to a determination of the value of
lost services are such things as prospective moral, intellectual
and physical education of children, special activities or abilities
such as maintenance of a family garden or workshop, and
knowledge and experience in financial and other decisions of
47. Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 225-26, 62 S.E.2d 297, 303 (1950).
Since 1962 recovery for funeral expenses has alternatively been allowed in
actions under the Survival Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-209.1 (Supp. 1966).
48. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-1954 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
49. 25A CJ.S. Death § 108 (1966).
50. Cf. Claussen v. Brothers, 148 S.C. 1, 4, 145 S.E. 539, 540 (1928) where
the court, in construing the Survival Act, said: "While the Act is remedial,
and a liberal construction should be given to its provisions . . . we must resort,
in arriving at the intent of the Legislature, to the actual words used in the
statute ......
51. Nelson v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry., 231 S.C. 351, 98 S.E.2d 798
(1957).
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the family.52 "There is probably no limit to the type of services
for which value may be recovered, and the imagination and in-
genuity of trial counsel can be given full rein."5 3
Other elements allowed for the jury's consideration by our
decisions can be conveniently grouped together as non-pecuniary
losses. Included are the elements of grief and sorrow, loss of
companionship, loss of society, comfort and protection, and the
wounded feelings of the beneficiaries.5 4 In this area, of course,
by definition the elements have no monetarily measurable value.
The decision as to reasonable compensation, based on all of the
facts and circumstances of the case, must be left to the sound
discretion of the jury.55 Although their estimation may be
enhanced by evidence of the closeness of the family and the
affectionate or kindly disposition of the deceased,56 the existence
of this kind of loss, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
is normally assumed by the jury, and an instruction that they
may consider thlis will often be sufficient.
In South Carolina, plaintiffs in some situations have the
benefit of presumptions of certain damages. In Gilliam v.
Sout7e Ry.57 the court enunciated a presumption of pecuniary
damages to a wife and minor child from the death of the hus-
band and father. The court reasoned that since it was a mis-
demeanor for an able-bodied man to, without just cause, fail to
support his wife and minor children, "prima facie and pre-
sumptively, the widow and minor unmarried child of deceased
had a legal pecuniary interest in the continuance of his life."58
Later, in a case where the deceased was the twelve year old
son of the plaintiff parents, the court said: "It will be assumed
that he was held in loving esteem by his parents and that they
experienced the natural feelings of grief in the loss of a loving
son.9
5 9
53. Page, Damages For Wrongful Death Under FELA, 30 NACCA L.J.
271, 274 (1964) quoting from Spangenberg, Proof Of Damages For Wrongful
Death, WRONGFUL DEATH AxD SURVIVORSHIP: NACCA 6th CERcuIT SEMINAR
72 (Beall ed. 1958).
54. E.g., Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950); Jen-
nings v. McCowan, 215 S.C. 404, 55 S.E2d 522 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
956 (1950).
55. E.g., Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963).
56. See Werchick, Unmeasmrable Damages and a Yardstick, 17 HASTINGS
L.J. 263 (1965).
57. 108 S.C. 195, 93 S.E. 865 (1917).
58. Id. at 199, 93 S.E. at 866.
59. Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 S.C. 245, 259, 87 S.E.2d 830,
836 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 19
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Referring to this statement in a case where the beneficiaries
were brothers of the deceased, the court said:
However, in the case of collateral relatives, the presumption,
if any, of this kind would not be a strong one. Where the
action is brought for the benefit of brothers and sisters, the
amount of recovery must necessarily be gauged by the inti-
macy of the relation, association, and the feelings of the
beneficiaries toward the deceased.60
It seems to be a fair inference from these cases that where the
action is for the benefit of the decedent's wife and minor chil-
dren, non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary damages may be pre-
sined in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
One particularly troublesome situation concerning "evidence
to the contrary" in South Carolina is the effect of evidence of
separation or marital misconduct on actions for wrongful death.
The general rule in most jurisdictions is that marital misconduct
and separation short of divorce, while they certainly may influ-
ence the amount of damages, do not deprive the surviving spouse
of his or her status as a beneficiary in Death Act cases. 61 In
South Carolina, however, it seems to be settled law that, al-
though the wife is not barred from recovery by the husband's
abandonment of his family or by her adultery after such aban-
donment,62 the wife's adultery prior to abandonment by the
husband or the wife's desertion of the husband not only rebuts
any presumption of damages but absolutely bars recovery.6 3
60. Nelson v. Charleston & W. Carolina R.R., 231 S.C. 351, 360, 98 S.E.2d
798, 801-02 (1957).
61. 22 Am. JuR. 2d Death § 68 (1965).
62. Gilliam v. Southern Ry., 108 S.C. 195, 93 S.E. 865 (1917).
63. South Carolina's minority position was originally enunciated by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Lytle v. Southern Ry., 152 S.C. 161, 149
S.E. 692 (1929), a case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In this
decision the court affirmed the order of the circuit court overruling a de-
murrer of the defendant. After trial, the court readily accepted the oppor-
tunity afforded by the defendant's new appeal to elaborate the holding in the
prior decision. Lytle v. Southern Ry., 171 S.C. 221, 171 S.E. 42, cert. denied,
290 U.S. 645 (1933). The court based its decision on an interpretation of the
word widow in the FELA. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1954).
In Folk v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 736 (W.D.S.C.), re7/d on other
grounds, 199 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1952), the federal court, although dealing with
a case under the South Carolina Death Act, cited Lytle as controlling. Id. at
740. Accord, Sanders v. Green, 208 F. Supp. 873 (E.D.S.C. 1962).
1967] NoT
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E. Other Decedents
The foregoing discussion, although it has concentrated on the
damages recoverable in the event of the wrongful death of the
family breadwinner, applies also, in some particulars, to cases
of deaths of wives and children. Although outside the scope of
this article, it should be noted that deaths of non-income pro-
ducing members of the family present different challenges.
Introducing evidence sufficient to enable the jury to fully com-
prehend the loss of a wife and mother and to translate that loss
into dollars is a formidable if not impossible task.64 With a
deceased child, the difficulties are multiplied; the monetarily
measurable elements comprise a still smaller fraction of the
total loss and are, if present at all, extremely speculative. 65 The
difficulties with these decedents offer still further substantiation
of South Carolina's liberal position on non-pecuniary damages.
F. C'onwlion
It is apparent that the various statements purporting to be
the measure of damages in Death Act cases in South Carolina
are, at most, necessarily broad generalities. Whether cause or
effect, the concomitant fact is an almost omnipotent jury.66 Add
to this the liberal position of our court in the matter of non-
pecuniary damages and the fact that a jury in a South Carolina
Death Act case may assess punitive damages 67 and the result
might reasonably be expected to be a pattern of recognizably
high awards. However, as difficult as it is to compare awards
made in cases under different statutes including different evi-
dence and different facts, attempts at comparison seem to indi-
cate, if anything, a rather consistent pattern of conservative
awards.6 8
ROBERT L. WYNN, II
64. See generally Lambert, How Much Is A Good Wife Worth?, 41 B.U.L.
Rnv. 328 (1961).
65. See generally Lambert, Wrongful Death Of A Child, 30 NACCA L.J.
188 (1964).
66. See, e.g., Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 S.C. 245, 266-68, 87
S.E.2d 830, 839-40 (1955).
67. S.C. CODE ANI'. § 10-1954 (1962).
68. See, e.g., 6 BELLI, MoDERN TRrALs § 279 (1963).
[Vol. 19
11
Wynn: Death of the Head of the Family--Elements of Damages under South
Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
